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ABSTRACT. This paper provides an overview of what the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) calls
“indirect and direct drivers” of change in ecosystem services at a global level. The MA definition of a
driver is any natural or human-induced factor that directly or indirectly causes a change in an ecosystem.
A direct driver unequivocally influences ecosystem processes. An indirect driver operates more diffusely
by altering one or more direct drivers. Global driving forces are categorized as demographic, economic,
sociopolitical, cultural and religious, scientific and technological, and physical and biological. Drivers in
all categories other than physical and biological are considered indirect. Important direct drivers include
changes in climate, plant nutrient use, land conversion, and diseases and invasive species. This paper does
not discuss natural drivers such as climate variability, extreme weather events, or volcanic eruptions.
Key Words: ecosystem services; drivers of change; direct drivers; indirect drivers; demographic drivers;
economic drivers; sociopolitical drivers; cultural and religious drivers; scientific and technological drivers;
physical and biological drivers; climate change; plant nutrient use; land conversion; diseases; invasive
species

INTRODUCTION
This paper provides an overview of what the
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) calls
“indirect and direct drivers” of change in ecosystem
services (for more information about the genesis and
details of the MA conceptual framework, see Fig. 1
in Carpenter et al. 2006 and Chapter 2 in Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment 2003). The underpinning
assumption is that ecosystem change is brought
about by a complex web of interactions between
humans and their surroundings as humans seek to
satisfy their basic needs and improve their wellbeing. To systematize our approach to
understanding these interactions, we describe the
relationship in terms of “drivers” of ecosystem
change. In this paper we provide a heavily
condensed summary of the important drivers of
ecosystem condition at a global level (for full
details, please see Chapter 9 of Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment 2005b).
1

The MA definition of a driver is any natural or
human-induced factor that directly or indirectly
causes a change in an ecosystem (Carpenter et al.
2006). A direct driver unequivocally influences
ecosystem processes. An indirect driver operates
more diffusely by altering one or more direct
drivers. The categories of global driving forces are
demographic, economic, sociopolitical, cultural and
religious, scientific and technological, and physical
and biological. Drivers in all categories other than
physical and biological are considered indirect.
Important direct, i.e., physical and biological,
drivers include changes in climate, plant nutrient
use, land conversion, and diseases and invasive
species.
Changes in ecosystem services are almost always
caused by multiple interacting drivers. These
drivers can work over time, e.g., population and
income growth interacting with technological
advances that lead to climate change, or over levels
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of organization, e.g., from local zoning laws to
international environmental treaties; they can also
happen intermittently, e.g., droughts, wars, and
economic crises. For example, reviews of case
studies of deforestation and desertification (Geist
and Lambin 2002, 2004) reveal that synergetic
factor combinations are the most common, i.e., the
combined effects of multiple drivers that are
amplified by reciprocal action and feedbacks.
Drivers interact across spatial, temporal, and
organizational scales. Global trends such as climate
change or globalization can influence regional
contexts of local ecosystem management. For
example, a study in South Africa found that changes
in the export prices of cash crops can trigger landuse changes at the local level. The removal of
national credits and subsidies causes some farmers
to become more vulnerable to environmental
changes, whereas others profit from easier access
to markets and become less vulnerable to climate
change (Leichenko and O’Brien 2002).
Any specific ecosystem change is the result of a
myriad of interactions among drivers. Although
some drivers are global, the actual set of interactions
that brings about an ecosystem change is more or
less specific to a particular place. For example, a
link between increasing producer prices and
production growth can be found in many places
throughout the world. The strength of this effect,
however, is determined by a range of locationspecific factors that include production conditions,
the availability of resources and knowledge, and the
economic situation of the farmer (Jones 2002). No
single conceptual framework exists that captures the
broad range of case study evidence (Lambin et al.
2001).
Changes in ecosystem services feed back to the
drivers of change. For example, altered ecosystems
create new opportunities and constraints on land
use, induce institutional changes in response to
perceived and anticipated resource degradation and
shortages, and give rise to social effects such as
changes in income inequality because there are
winners and losers in environmental change.
It is important to emphasize at the outset what this
paper does not do. First, we do not discuss natural
drivers such as climate variability, extreme weather
events, or volcanic eruptions. This paper focuses on
anthropogenic drivers. Second, we do not discuss
interactions among drivers in any detail. Finally, we

do not address the very important issue of how
changes in drivers actually affect ecosystems. This
paper limits its attention to the drivers themselves.
INDIRECT DRIVERS
We begin with a discussion of the categories of
indirect drivers: demographic, economic, sociopolitical,
cultural and religious, and scientific and
technological.
Demographic drivers
In this section, we address population dynamics by
focusing on current conditions and the primary
determinants of population change: fertility,
mortality, and migration.
Current conditions
The global population increased by 2 x 109 during
the last quarter of the 20th century, reaching 6 x 109
in 2000. During that time, birth rates in many parts
of the world fell far more quickly than anticipated,
and life expectancies, with some notable exceptions,
improved steadily. At the beginning of the 21st
century, population growth rates were declining
nearly everywhere. The global growth rate peaked
at 2.1%/yr in the late 1960s and has since fallen to
1.35%. Despite the declining growth rate, the global
population is likely to increase by another 3 x 109
by 2050 (see Fig. 1). Nonetheless, the end of world
population growth, while not imminent, is now on
the horizon (Lutz et al. 2001).
Recent decades of rapid demographic change have
produced unprecedented demographic diversity
across regions and countries (Cohen 2003).
Although substantial population increases are still
expected in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and the
Middle East, growth has slowed or even stopped in
Europe and East Asia, and rapid aging has become
a serious concern.
Traditional demographic country groupings are
breaking down. In the USA, a high-income country,
a doubling of population in the future is anticipated.
Many developing countries, including China,
Thailand, and North and South Korea, now have the
low fertility rates that until recently were found only
in high-income countries. Mortality rates vary
widely across countries as well. Life expectancies
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Fig. 1. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA) world population scenarios. Each curve corresponds to
one of the four MA scenarios: Order from Strength (OS), Adaptive Mosaic (AM), TechnoGarden (TG),
and Global Orchestration (GO). The International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) data
are from Lutz and Goujon (2001). The UN data are from UN (2002). From "Ecosystems and Human
Well-being: Scenarios, Volume 2" by Steve R. Carpenter, et al., eds. Copyright (c) 2005 Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment. Reproduced by permission of Island Press, Washington, D.C.

are substantially higher in high-income countries
(about 75 yr) than in developing countries (63 yr),
although the gap has closed from more than 17 yr
in the early 1970s to about 12 yr today. Particular
countries or regions have done much better, or
worse, than the average: life expectancy in East Asia
grew impressively over the past few decades,
whereas improvements stalled in Russia and have
reversed in parts of Africa, mainly because of the
impact of HIV/AIDS and wars.

Certain regions are also distinguished by their
degree of urbanization. High-income countries
typically have populations that are 70–80% urban.
Some developing regions, such as parts of Asia, are
still largely rural, whereas Latin America, at 75%
urban, is indistinguishable from high-income
countries in this regard.
The diversity of current conditions means that future
demographic change will be highly variable as well.
Current age structures are a key determinant of
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population growth over the next few decades,
because of the “momentum” inherent in young
populations. Thus, current high-fertility regions
with young age structures (sub-Saharan Africa, the
Middle East, and South Asia) have population
growth built in, whereas the low fertility and aging
populations of most European countries have given
them a “negative momentum” that will result in a
population decline even if fertility rises in the future
(Lutz et al. 2003).
Population growth over the next several decades is
expected to be concentrated in low-income urban
communities in some developing countries.
However, in a few important developing countries,
with China as the most dramatic example,
population growth will cease because of sharp
declines in fertility, and rapid aging of the
population is projected.
The demographic transition and determinants of
fertility, mortality, and migration
To understand the recent dramatic changes in
demographic variables, demographers use the
cohort component method, which analyses the
determinants of fertility, mortality, and migration
and projects trends in these three components to
arrive at estimates of future population change. This
section briefly sketches the principal determinants
for each component and describes the resulting
demographic transition.
The demographic transition. The concept of
demographic transition is a generalization of the
events observed over the past two centuries in those
countries with the highest incomes today. These
countries shifted from small, slowly growing
populations with high mortality and high fertility to
large, slowly growing populations with low
mortality and low fertility (Knodel and Walle 1979,
Lee 2003). During this type of transition, population
growth initially accelerates because the decline in
death rates precedes the decline in birth rates,
creating a sudden surplus of births over deaths, and
then declines as fertility rates fall. The transition is
well advanced in all developing countries except in
sub-Saharan Africa, and even there the beginnings
of a fertility decline are apparent (Cohen 1998,
Garenne 2002).
Determinants of mortality. Mortality decline begins
with reductions in deaths from infectious diseases,
especially of infants, because of improvements in

public health and hygiene and better nutrition as
incomes and food availability rise (Lee 2003).
Further reductions in mortality are driven by
reductions in the incidence of chronic and
degenerative diseases such as heart disease and
cancer.
In most developing countries, future reductions in
mortality and corresponding improvements in life
expectancy will be determined by the efficiency of
local health services; reductions in the incidence of
key diseases such as malaria, tuberculosis, and HIV/
AIDS; and improved living standards and
education. The future course of the HIV/AIDS
epidemic could substantially affect mortality in
many countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa,
where HIV prevalence is high. In Botswana, for
example, life expectancy dropped from about 65 yr
in the early 1990s to 56 yr in the late 1990s and is
expected to decline to less than 40 yr by 2005 (UN
2003b).
Determinants of fertility. The basic model of fertility
decline assumes that economic development leads
to lower fertility because it increases the net cost of
children (Becker 1960, Becker and Barro 1988).
Parental preferences shift away from large families
toward a smaller number of children requiring
greater investments in education and health,
whereas higher wages and the participation of more
women in the labor force increase the opportunity
costs of raising children. A range of other factors
can be important as well, including the effects of
development on attitudes toward fertility regulation
(Easterlin 1969, 1975), women’s childbearing
desires and their ability to achieve them, shifts in
family structures toward the child-centered nuclear
family (Caldwell 1982), and the spread of new ideas,
particularly regarding birth control (Cleland and
Wilson 1987, Bongaarts and Watkins 1996).
Population-related policies have also played a role
in recent fertility decreases in developing countries
over the past several decades and are likely to affect
future fertility. One estimate concluded that 43% of
the fertility decline in developing countries between
the early 1960s and late 1980s could be attributed
to such programs (Bongaarts 1997).
Determinants of international migration. Current
and future international migration is more difficult
to identify and project than fertility or mortality
trends. Migration flows often reflect short-term
changes in economic, social, or political factors that
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are difficult to predict. Because no single
compelling theory of migration exists, projections
are generally based on past trends and current
policies, which may not be relevant in the future.
Even past migration flows provide minimal
guidance because there is often little information
about them.
Projecting future demographic trends.
In those countries with high fertility, defined here
as fertility above the replacement level of slightly
more than two births per woman, demographic
transition theory provides the primary basis for
forecasting fertility trends. However, it provides
little guidance about future demographic trends for
countries that have already achieved low fertility.
Total fertility has been below replacement level in
20 European countries for at least two decades and
has fallen below replacement level in the 59
developing countries that account for 45% of the
world's population (UN 2003a). In some countries,
fertility has remained low, whereas in others such
as the USA and Sweden, fertility rose nearly to
replacement level again and, in Sweden, then
returned again to low levels.
Economic drivers: consumption, production,
and globalization
Economic activity is a consequence of humans
striving to improve their well-being. The outputs of
this activity are determined by natural resource
endowments, including ecosystem services (natural
capital), the number and skills of humans (labor and
human capital), the stock of built resources
(manufactured capital), and the nature of human
institutions, both formal and informal (social
capital). In addition to the intended outputs,
economic activity can also have side effects, called
externalities, with usually negative consequences
for ecosystems.

patterns is a consequence of two related facets of
human behavior: the limit to the quantity of food
one human can consume and the desire for diversity.
The first result of this is Engel’s law, which is named
after the German statistician who first observed the
statistical regularity with which, as income grows,
the share of additional income spent on food
declines. The second is a shift in the primary source
of calories from starchy staples, e.g., rice, wheat,
root crops, to diverse diets that include more fat,
meat, and fish as well as fruits and vegetables as the
ability to afford these food groups rises; this
phenomenon is known as Bennett’s law, after
findings in Bennett (1941) and related comparative
studies of the consumption of staple foods.
An important consequence of Engel’s and Bennett’s
laws is that, as incomes increase, the demand for
nonagricultural goods and services increases faster
than demand for agricultural products; this leads to
a dramatic change in the structure of economic
activity and a true structural transformation.
Producers respond by devoting relatively more
resources to industry and service activities than to
agriculture. The shift to a more diverse and more
expensive diet, in particular to more animal- and
fish-based protein intake, slows this process, but
eventually the demand for more diverse diets is
satisfied, and further income growth is spent almost
entirely on nonagricultural goods and services.

Economic growth, changing consumption patterns,
and structural transformation

A consequence of this transformation is that, with
income growth, industry’s share of output rises
initially but then falls, whereas the share of services
in economic output rises continuously. In 2000,
agriculture accounted for 5% of the world gross
domestic product (GDP), industry for 31%, and
service industries for 64% (Rosen 2002). Figure 2
documents the shift in economic structure from
agricultural production to industry and, to a greater
extent, services for the world’s largest economies
during the past two centuries. In developing regions,
the decline in agriculture’s share has been especially
rapid in recent years, and the growth in services’
share has been much faster than was the case
historically in the now-rich countries.

Human well-being is clearly affected by economic
growth and its distribution. Income received by
individuals and families determines their level and
nature of consumption. As per capita income grows,
the nature of consumption changes, shifting from
basic needs to goods and services that improve the
quality of life. This transformation of consumption

The shift away from agriculture to nonagricultural
goods and then services is sometimes viewed as a
process that ultimately reduces pressures on
ecosystems, because services are assumed to be the
least demanding of ecosystem products. However,
several caveats are in order. First, it is important to
distinguish between absolute and relative changes.
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Fig. 2. Changes in economic structure for selected countries. The source of the figure is Nakicenovic et
al. (2000); the source of the data is Maddison (1995). From "Ecosystems and Human Well-being:
Scenarios, Volume 2" by Steve R. Carpenter, et al., eds. Copyright (c) 2005 Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment. Reproduced by permission of Island Press, Washington, D.C.

With economic growth, the industrial and service
sectors grow more rapidly, so, although the relative
contribution of agriculture declines, the highincome countries almost always produce more
agricultural output than they did when they were
poor. Second, as labor leaves agriculture for the
industrial and services sectors, induced technological
change substitutes capital for labor in agriculture,
potentially altering the composition of the demand
for ecosystem services. Finally, urbanization also
influences the structure of consumption, increasing
the service content dramatically. For example, rural
consumers are more likely to consume food
produced at home. Urban consumers are more likely
to demand easily prepared, quick meals and to
purchase them from restaurants.

A few examples from Asian countries with rapidly
rising incomes illustrate these phenomena, although
similar changes are now occurring throughout the
developing world and have already taken place in
the industrial world in the 20th century. In China,
the human intake of cereals and the consumption of
coarse grains decreased during the past two decades
in both urban and rural populations, and there was
a dramatic increase in the consumption of animal
foods. A similar but less dramatic change is also
occurring in India, with a doubling of calories
derived from fat over a 20-yr period. Although
Indian consumption of rice and wheat has been
increasing, the percentage of all cereals in
household expenditures has been declining. Meat
consumption in India has been growing, although
not as fast as in China (FAO 2004). The major
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increases in food consumption in India are in milk,
eggs, fruit, vegetables, and vegetable oils (USDA
2001).
The use of supermarkets is one mechanism by which
the output of services in an economy grows, even
in agriculture-related activities. By 2002, the share
of supermarkets in the retail market for processed
and packaged food was 33% in Southeast Asia and
63% in East Asia. The share of supermarkets in fresh
foods was roughly 15–20% in Southeast Asia and
30% in East Asia outside China. The 2001
supermarket share of Chinese urban food markets
was 48%, up from 30% in 1999. Supermarkets are
also becoming an emerging force in South Asia,
particularly in urban India since the mid-1990s
(Pingali 2004).
Economic growth, distribution, and globalization
Beyond the basic observations that underlie the
structural transformation discussed above, the
effects of economic activity on ecosystems depend
on a number of factors, including the location of that
activity, resource endowments and ecosystem
condition, available technologies, policies, and
market reach. We begin this section with a summary
of economic growth statistics and then discuss key
determinants.
Perhaps the most comprehensive current compilation
of data on historical economic growth is that of
Maddison (2003; see Table 1). His data show that,
since 1820, the global GDP has increased by a factor
of 40, or at a rate of about 2.2%/yr. Between 1950
and 2000, the world GDP grew by 3.85%, resulting
in an average per capita income growth rate of
2.09% for that period (Maddison 2003).
In the late 20th century, income was distributed
unevenly both within countries and around the
world (see Fig. 3). Although the level of per capita
income was highest in North America, Western
Europe, Australasia, and Northeast Asia (see Fig.
4), growth rates were highest in South Asia, China,
and parts of South America (see Figs. 5 and 6). If
these trends continue, global income disparities will
be reduced, although within-country disparities
might increase. Africa is a conspicuous exception
to the trend of growing incomes.
Economic growth is facilitated by trade, which
allows countries to exploit the differences in relative
abundance of natural and human capital and

differences in tastes across borders. Growth in
international trade flows has exceeded growth in
global production for many years, and the
differential may be growing (Fig. 7). In 2001,
international trade in goods was equal to 40% of the
gross world product (World Bank 2003). The
growth of trade in manufactured goods has been
much more rapid than that of trade in agricultural
or mining products (Fig. 8).
Determinants of economic growth and development.
Economic growth and development depend on the
increasing availability and mobility of resources,
the efficiency with which they are used, and the
institutional and policy environment. For per capita
output to increase, total output must grow more
rapidly than the population.
Research based on historical evidence allows a
number of generalizations as to patterns of advances
in productivity and economic growth, including the
importance of economic openness to trade and
capital flows, the contribution of technological
change either through innovation or adoption, and
the importance of developing human capital.
There is strong empirical evidence of a positive
relationship between trade openness and productivity,
industrialization, and economic growth (Barro
1997). For example, between 1990 and 1998, the 12
fastest-growing developing countries saw their
exports of goods and services increase 14% and their
output 8% (World Bank 2002). However, not all
trade flows are equal in their effects on growth.
Dollar and Collier (2001) found that the countries
experiencing the most rapid trade-driven economic
growth were trading a large share of hightechnology products. Dosi et al. (1990) highlight the
critical roles of policies and institutions in realizing
economic gains from trade.
International capital flows are critical to economic
growth because they relieve resource constraints
and often facilitate technology transfers that
enhance the productivity of existing resources. The
late 20th-century trend toward more open
economies led to greater uniformity in
macroeconomic monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate
policies across the world and made it easier to move
capital across national borders. However, not all
developing countries participated equally. For
instance, the vast majority of private-sector capital
flows is concentrated in the 10 largest developing
countries (World Bank 2002).
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Table 1. Per capita gross domestic product growth rates for selected regions and time periods (percent per
year).

Region

1870–1913

1913–1950

1950–1980

1980–1992

1990–2000

Western Europe

1.3

0.9

3.5

1.7

1.7

Australia, Canada,
New Zealand,
USA

1.8

1.6

2.2

1.3

1.9

Eastern Europe

1.0

1.2

2.9

-2.4

0.6

Latin America

1.5

1.5

2.5

-0.6

1.4

Asia

0.6

0.1

3.5

3.6

3.2

Africa

0.5

1.0

1.8

-0.8

0.1

World (sample of
199 countries)

1.3

0.9

2.5

1.1

1.5

Productivity growth, which is essential to
improvements in per capita income, requires the
development and adoption of new technologies.
Expenditures on research and development have
high returns, although late-developing countries
can, for a time, rely on adapting technologies
developed elsewhere to improve productivity.
Growth rates tend to be lower for economies at the
technology and productivity frontier. For instance,
19th-century productivity and per capita GDP
growth rates in the rapidly industrializing USA far
exceeded those of England, which by then had
reached this frontier. Likewise, in the post-World
War II period, growth rates in Japan and most of
Western Europe exceeded rates in the USA, which
had also reached the frontier (Maddison 1991,
1995). The developing economies of Asia achieved
high per capita GDP growth rates beginning in the
1960s (Maddison 1995).
Economic growth requires an expansion of the
physical and institutional infrastructure, whose
development can have large impacts on ecosystems.
In a review of 152 studies of tropical deforestation,
Geist and Lambin (2002) found that 72 studies cited
infrastructure extension, including transportation,
markets, settlements, public services, and private-

sector activities, as an important direct driver. In a
similar paper evaluating 132 studies on
desertification, infrastructure extension was cited
73 times (Geist and Lambin 2004).
Economic productivity and energy and materials
use. Economy activity requires energy and physical
inputs, some of which are ecosystem services, to
produce goods and services. By-products such as
CO2 and other greenhouse gases, nutrients losses,
and the waste stream can cause substantial
ecosystem damage. The rate of conversion of inputs
to economically valuable outputs is an important
determinant of the impact on ecosystems. With
more efficient conversion, fewer inputs are needed,
and the potential for by-product effects on
ecosystems per unit of economic output is reduced.
Materials and energy inputs per unit of economic
activity are defined as “materials” and “energy
intensity,” respectively. Figure 9 shows material
intensity vs. per capita income data for 13 world
regions for several metals (van Vuuren et al. 1999).
Figure 10 shows a similar curve for total energy
intensity for China, India, Japan, and the USA, again
as a function of per capita income (Nakicenovic et
al. 1998).
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Fig. 3. Income level and distribution, 1970 and 2000 (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 2004). The data used are
adjusted to 1985 prices and to purchasing power parity and draw on Penn World Tables (see http://datac
entre2.chass.utoronto.ca/pwt/). From "Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Scenarios, Volume 2" by
Steve R. Carpenter, et al., eds. Copyright (c) 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Reproduced by
permission of Island Press, Washington, D.C.
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Fig. 4. Gross national income per person averaged for the period 1999–2003. National income is
converted to U.S. dollars using the World Bank Atlas method. U.S. dollar values are obtained from
domestic currencies using a 3-yr weighted average of the exchange rate (World Bank 2003). From
"Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Scenarios, Volume 2" by Steve R. Carpenter, et al., eds. Copyright
(c) 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Reproduced by permission of Island Press, Washington,
D.C.

Some evidence suggests that materials and energy
intensity follow an inverted U-curve (the IU
hypothesis) as income grows; that is, the
requirements per unit of economic activity rise for
some earlier increases in economic activity and then
decline. For some materials, the IU hypothesis
(Moll 1989, Tilton 1990) holds quite well. The
underlying explanatory factors are a mixture of
structural change in the economy along with
technology and resource substitution and
innovation processes.

such as oil products and electricity. Furthermore,
traditional methods of biomass combustion are not
only inefficient but lead to a wide range of health
hazards, such as indoor air pollution (Smith and
Mehta 2003). The shift to commercial energy
sources is accompanied by the adoption of improved
technologies that reduce intensity. Consequently, as
seen in Fig. 11, the resulting aggregate total of
commercial plus noncommercial energy intensity
shows a persistent declining trend (Watson et al.
1996, Nakicenovic et al. 1998).

The commercial energy intensity of the GDP
generally follows the IU hypothesis as well. The
initial rising part of commercial energy intensity
stems from replacing traditional energy sources and
technologies with modern commercial energy
sources. Traditional energy sources such as
fuelwood, manure, and crop residues have low
energy intensity relative to modern energy sources

Two important points emerge from Figs. 9–11. First,
energy and materials intensity, i.e., energy use per
unit of economic output, tend to decline with rising
levels of GDP per capita. In other words, energy and
material productivity, the inverse of energy
intensity, improve in line with overall macroeconomic
productivity.
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Fig. 5. Average annual growth rate of gross domestic product per capita, 1990–2003. From "Ecosystems
and Human Well-being: Scenarios, Volume 2" by Steve R. Carpenter, et al., eds. Copyright (c) 2005
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Reproduced by permission of Island Press, Washington, D.C

Second, growth in productivity and intensity has
historically been outpaced by the growth in
economic output. Hence, materials and energy use
has risen in absolute terms over time (see, for
example, Grübler 1998). An important issue for
ecosystems is whether technological advancement
can outpace economic growth and lead to reductions
in materials and energy use.

traditional resource- and energy-intensive industries
have been in the past. Low historical rates of energy
intensity improvement reflect the low priority
placed on energy efficiency by most producers and
users of technology because energy costs have only
about a 5% share of the GDP. In contrast, labor has
a much larger share of the GDP, and improvements
in labor productivity were above 2%/yr over the
period 1870–1992.

Table 2 reports selected macroeconomic, labor,
energy, and material productivity increases that
have been achieved in a range of economies and
sectors at different times. (See also Scientific and
technological drivers.) Of these examples,
productivity increases are the highest for
communications. Many observers consider that
communication technologies will be as important a
driver of economic growth in the future as

Government policies can distort market outcomes
by increasing or reducing prices and changing
production and consumption levels. However, the
consequences for ecosystems are neither straightforward
nor uniform. By some estimates, distortions in
agricultural markets are the largest. Total support
to agriculture in OECD countries from marketaltering government policies averaged more than
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Fig. 6. Average annual growth rate of gross domestic product, 1990–2003. From "Ecosystems and
Human Well-being: Scenarios, Volume 2" by Steve R. Carpenter, et al., eds. Copyright (c) 2005
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Reproduced by permission of Island Press, Washington, D.C.

$324 x 109 annually in 2001–2003. About three
quarters of this amount was used to support farm
income directly, whereas the remainder went into
general infrastructure improvements, research,
marketing, and so on (OECD 2004). Much of the
cost was for subsidies in the form of higher prices
to farmers, thus providing a direct incentive to
increase agricultural production. In low-income
countries, on the other hand, governments
sometimes tax agriculture directly or indirectly and
do not provide much support for research,
marketing, and transportation infrastructure
(Anderson and Hayami 1986).
Annual global energy subsidies currently total $200
x 109 (de Moor 2002). OECD countries spend some
$82 x 109 each year subsidizing energy production,
mostly through tax breaks, cheap provision of public
infrastructure and services, subsidized capital, and

price support (OECD 1997). Globally, more than
80% of these subsidies are for the use of fossil fuels,
among the most polluting energy sources.
Sociopolitical drivers
Sociopolitical drivers encompass the forces that
influence decision making in the large conceptual
space between economics and culture. The
boundaries among economic, sociopolitical, and
cultural categories of drivers are fluid, and they
change with time, level of analysis, and observer
(Young 2002).
Most observers would agree that sociopolitical
driving forces have been important in past
environmental change (see, for example, de Vries
and Goudsblom 2002). However, with some
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Fig. 7. Growth of world trade and gross domestic product (GDP), 1930–1995. GATT stands for General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and WTO for World Trade Organization. Source: World Trade
Organization (2003:13). From "Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Scenarios, Volume 2" by Steve R.
Carpenter, et al., eds. Copyright (c) 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Reproduced by
permission of Island Press, Washington, D.C.

exceptions, such as public participation and
governance of the commons, empirical research is
limited, as is the basis for strong conclusions about
how these drivers work. Sociopolitical drivers may
be some of the most fundamental elements of how
humans influence the environment. One important
element of sociopolitical drivers, i.e., human
conflicts, acts both as a direct and an indirect driver
of change in ecosystem services and human wellbeing when nature becomes the recipient of
“collateral damage.” War-driven environmental
degradation can initiate social degradation and
protracted cycles of social and environmental
decline by creating poverty, overexploitation of

marginal resources, underdevelopment, and, in
extreme cases, famine and social destruction (Berhe
2000).
The literature on public participation in
environmental assessment and decision making
indicates that such involvement at the local and
regional levels generally leads to more sustainable
approaches to managing resources (Beierle and
Cayford 2002, Dietz et al. 2003).
Some strong generalizations have emerged from the
literature on the governance of commons (Ostrom
et al. 2002) that contrast with Hardin’s original stark
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Fig. 8. World merchandise trade by major trade groups 1950–2001 (WTO 2002). From "Ecosystems and
Human Well-being: Scenarios, Volume 2" by Steve R. Carpenter, et al., eds. Copyright (c) 2005
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Reproduced by permission of Island Press, Washington, D.C.

conclusions about the “tragedy of the commons”
(Hardin 1968). We are more likely to govern
commons sustainably when:
●

resources and the use of the resources by
humans can be monitored, and the
information can be verified and understood
at relatively low cost;

●

rates of change in resources, resource-user
populations, technology, and economic and
social conditions are moderate;

●

communities maintain frequent face-to-face
communication and dense social networks;

●

outsiders can be excluded at relatively low
cost from using the resource; and

●

users support effective monitoring and rule
enforcement (Dietz et al. 2003:1908).

Cultural and religious drivers
The word “culture” has many definitions in both the
social sciences and ordinary language. To
understand culture as a driver of ecosystem change,
it may be most useful to focus on the values, beliefs,
and norms that a group of people share and that have
the most influence on decision making about the
environment. In this sense, culture conditions the
individual’s perceptions of the world, influences
what he or she considers important, and suggests
courses of action that are appropriate and
inappropriate. Although culture is most often
thought of as a characteristic of national or ethnic
groups, this definition also acknowledges the
emergence of cultures within professions and
organizations, along with the possibility that an
individual may be able to draw on or reconcile more
than one culture.
Broad comparisons of whole cultures have not
proved useful because they ignore vast internal
variations in values, beliefs, and norms. However,
a growing number of studies have been conducted
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Fig. 9. Metals intensity with changes in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita expressed as
purchasing power parity (PPP) for 13 world regions. Source: Nakicenovic et al. (2003). Metals include
refined steel and MedAlloy, which represents the sum of copper, lead, zinc, tin, and nickel. The dashed
curves are isolines that represent a constant per capita consumption of metals. The thick line indicates
the inverse U-shaped curve that best describes the trends in the different regions as part of a global metal
model (Van Vuuren et al. 1999). From "Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Scenarios, Volume 2" by
Steve R. Carpenter, et al., eds. Copyright (c) 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Reproduced by
permission of Island Press, Washington, D.C.
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Fig. 10. Energy intensity changes with changes in per capita (cap) income for China, India, Japan, and
the USA. Historical data for the USA since 1800 are presented. Data are converted from domestic
currencies using market exchange rates (mer). GDP stands for gross domestic product. Source:
Nakicenovic et al. (1998). From "Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Scenarios, Volume 2" by Steve
R. Carpenter, et al., eds. Copyright (c) 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Reproduced by
permission of Island Press, Washington, D.C.

in parallel in multiple societies and allow for
systematic examination of the role of culture
without overgeneralizing (Dunlap and Mertig 1995,
Rosa et al. 2000, Hanada 2003).
It is clear that there is broad concern with the
environment across the globe (Dunlap et al. 1993),
but it is less clear how that concern translates into
either changes in consumer behavior or political

action. In many circumstances, changing values,
beliefs, and norms will have no effect on behavior
because individuals face structural constraints to
pro-environmental behavior. For example, public
education about the problems of using tropical
hardwoods will have little impact if people have no
way of knowing the origins of the lumber they
purchase.
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Fig. 11. Energy intensity changes over time for China, India, Japan, and the USA. Data are converted
from domestic currencies using market exchange rates. GDP stands for gross domestic product, mer for
market exchange rate. Source: Nakicenovic et al. (1998). From "Ecosystems and Human Well-being:
Scenarios, Volume 2" by Steve R. Carpenter, et al., eds. Copyright (c) 2005 Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment. Reproduced by permission of Island Press, Washington, D.C.

A tradition stretching from Kluckholm (1952)
through Rokeach (1968, 1973) to Schwartz (1992)
has provided theoretical and empirical arguments
to support the idea that values, i.e., the things that
people consider important in their lives, are
important in shaping behavior and are relatively
stable over the life course. Two strains of research
have applied this logic to environmental concerns.
Inglehart (1995) has suggested that a set of values

he calls “post-materialist” predicts environmental
concern. His argument is that only when people have
achieved a reasonable degree of material security
can they assign priority to issues such as the
environment. However, there is considerable
controversy regarding the empirical support for this
argument at either the individual or the national
level (e.g. Stern et al. 1999, York et al. 2003).
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Table 2. Examples of productivity growth. GDP stands for gross domestic product.

Sector/Technology

Region

Productivity indicator

Period

Annual productivity
change (%)

Whole economy †

12 European countries

GDP/capita

1870–1992

1.7

Whole economy †

12 European countries

GDP/hour worked

1870–1992

2.2

Whole economy †

USA

GDP/hour worked

1870–1973

2.3

Whole economy †

USA

GDP/hour worked

1973–1992

1.1

Whole economy †

Japan

GDP/hour worked

1950–1973

7.7

Whole economy †

South Korea

GDP/hour worked

1950–1992

4.6

Whole economy ‡

World

GDP/primary energy

1971–1995

1.0

Whole economy ‡

OECD

GDP/primary energy

1971–1995

1.3

Whole economy ‡

USA

GDP/primary energy

1800–1995

0.9

Whole economy ‡

UK

GDP/primary energy

1890–1995

0.9

Whole economy ‡

China

GDP/primary energy

1977–1995

4.9

Whole economy §

Japan

GDP/material use

1975–1994

2.0

Whole economy §

USA

GDP/material use

1975–1994

2.5

Agriculture | ¶

Ireland

Wheat (t/ha)

1950–1990

5.3

Agriculture |

Japan

Rice (t/ha)

1950–1996

2.2

Agriculture |

India

Rice (t/ha)

1950–1996

2.0

Industry †

OECD (6 countries)

Value added/hour
worked

1950–1984

5.3

Industry †

Japan

Value added/hour
worked

1950–1973

7.3

Industry ‡

OECD

Industrial production/
energy

1971–1995

2.5

Industry ‡

OECD

Industrial production/
energy

1974–1986

8.0

New cars #

USA

Vehicle fuel economy

1972–1982

7.0

New cars #

USA

Vehicle fuel economy

1982–1992

0.0

Commercial aviation ††

World

Ton-km/energy

1974–1988

3.8

Commercial aviation ††

World

Ton-km/energy

1988–1995

0.3

Commercial aviation ††

World

Ton-km/labor

1974–1995

5.6

(con'd)
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Telephone call costs ¶

Transatlantic

London/NY, cost for 3
min

1925–1995

8.5

Telephone cables ¶

Transatlantic

Telephone calls/unit
cable mass

1914–1994

25.0

†

Data Source: Maddison (1995).
Data Source: OECD and IEA statistics.
§
Data Source: World Resources Institute (1997)
|
Data Source: FAO (1963–1996) Production Statistics.
¶
Data Source: OECD (1998), Waggoner (1996), Hayami and Ruttan (1985)
#Data Source: Including light trucks, Schipper (1996)
††
Data Source: International Civil Aviation Organization (1995)
‡

Scientific and technological drivers
The development and diffusion of scientific
knowledge and technologies that exploit knowledge
have profound implications for ecological systems
and human well-being. The 20th century saw
tremendous advances in our understanding how the
world works and in the applications of that
knowledge to human endeavors. Earlier sections
have documented examples of tremendous
productivity gains in many industries. We focus
here on agricultural science and technology because
of its obvious implications for land conversion and
widespread consequences for many ecosystems.
The groundbreaking research of Gregor Mendel in
the 1860s on the heritability of phenotypical
characteristics in garden peas laid the foundation
for 20th-century advances in plant and livestock
breeding research (Huffman and Evenson 1993).
Since the beginning of the 20th century, there have
been two waves in the development and diffusion
of biological technology in agriculture. The first
wave took place mainly in North America and
Europe in the 1930s and focused on important
temperate-climate crops. The discovery of yield
increases from hybrid crop varieties, i.e., those in
which two genetically distinct cultivars or inbred
lines from different parent plants can produce a plant
of greater vigor and higher yield than the parents,
and the commercialization of technology that
dramatically lowered the price of nitrogenous
fertilizers and led to a rapid increase in their use, set
the stage for major yield improvements in some of
the most important food crops in high-income
countries, especially maize. Average U.S. maize

yields improved from 24.4 bushels/acre (1.53 t/ha)
in 1860 to 116.2 bushels/acre (7.31 t/ha) in 1989, a
more than fourfold increase over about 130 yr.
However, even crops such as wheat, for which
hybridization has not been commercially viable,
saw similar improvements. Wheat yields grew from
11.0 bushels/acre (0.74 t/ha) in 1860 to 32.8 bushels/
acre (2.21 t/ha) in 1989 (Huffman and Evenson
1993).
The second wave of agricultural technology
development, sometimes called the Green
Revolution, was particularly important in the
developing world because it extended plant
breeding and nutrient management techniques to
important food crops in low-income countries.
Since the early 1960s, productivity growth has been
significant for rice in Asia, wheat in irrigated and
favorable production environments worldwide, and
maize in Mesoamerica and selected parts of Africa
and Asia. Yields of the major cereals, especially
with increased use of inorganic fertilizers with high
nitrogen contents, have continued to rise at a linear
rate after the initial dramatic shifts in the 1960s for
rice and wheat. For example, Table 3 shows that
yields in irrigated spring wheat have risen at the rate
of 1%/yr over the past three decades, an increase of
about 100 kg·ha-1·yr-1 (Pingali and Rajaram 1999).
Although high-potential environments gained the
most in terms of productivity growth from these
modern crop varieties, the less favorable
environments benefited as well through technology
spillovers and through labor migration to more
productive environments. According to David and
Otsuka (1994), wage equalization across favorable
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Table 3. Rate of growth of wheat yield by mega-environment, Elite Spring Wheat Yield Trial, 1964–1995.

Period

ME1

ME2

ME4

ME5

Percent per year

1.22

1.72

1.54

1.41

Kg per year

71.6

81.5

32.4

34.9

Percent per year

0.82

1.16

3.48

2.10

Kg per year

53.5

62.5

87.7

46.1

1964–1978

1979-1999

and unfavorable environments was one of the
primary means of redistributing the gains of
technological change. The wages of workers in
unfavorable environments are pulled up by the
demand for additional labor in the favorable
environments. Renkow (1993) found similar results
for wheat grown in high- and low-potential
environments in Pakistan.
Most of the increase in agricultural output over the
past 40 yr has come from an increase in yields per
hectare rather than an expansion of the area under
cultivation. For instance, FAO data indicate that, for
all developing countries, wheat yields rose by 208%
from 1960 to 2000, rice yields rose 109%, maize
yields rose 157%, potato yields rose 78%, and
cassava yields rose 36% (FAO 2004). Achieving
these substantial increases in yields reduced the
need to expand the amount of area cropped, which
in turn reduced the pressure to convert natural
ecosystems to farmland (Waggoner 1996, Tilman
et al. 2002). At the same time, the overuse or
inappropriate use of inputs has had negative effects
on ecosystem services.
A third wave of agricultural technology
development based on techniques for transferring
genetic material from one organism to another to
produce organisms that would not occur via normal
reproductive methods is in its early stages. The
initial commercialized products of this technology,
glyphosate-resistant soybeans and maize and cotton

that are resistant to lepidopteran pests, were
developed principally by private research firms
(Nelson 2001). These early products of genetic
engineering do not have higher potential yields than
traditional varieties, but they often have higher
effective yields because they reduce the cost of
chemical pest control. Varieties of food crops with
other desirable characteristics such as the so-called
golden rice with increased beta-carotene content,
wheat with increased drought tolerance, and papaya
with improved virus resistance are in various stages
of development.
Rapid innovation in agriculture in the past century
required supporting institutional change. The key
institutional innovations were national agricultural
research systems that included universities,
agricultural field stations, agricultural input
companies, and extension services covering the
chain from basic crop improvement research via
field trials to disseminating information and new
seed material to farmers (Ruttan 2001). Funding for
these new institutions was provided mainly by the
public sector in the first half of the century. Privatesector research grew substantially in the second half
as the private sector gained legal rights to protect
genetic modifications (Huffman and Evenson
1993). In labor-scarce countries, particularly the
USA, the private sector played a central role from
the beginning in the development of agricultural
machinery.
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The contributions of the international agricultural
research centers, in particular the Centro
Internacional de Mejoramiento de Maíz y Trigo
(CIMMYT) in Mexico and the International Rice
Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines, were
essential. Their strategy for increasing the
productivity of food crops was based explicitly on
the premise that, given appropriate institutional
mechanisms, technology spillovers across political
and agro-climatic boundaries can be captured. In
addition, high rates of investment in national crop
research, infrastructure, and market development
combined with appropriate policy support fueled
the resulting growth in land productivity (Pingali
and Heisey 2001).
Since the 1990s, the locus of agricultural research
and development has shifted dramatically from the
public to the private multinational sector. Three
interrelated forces in this latter wave of
globalization are transforming the system for
supplying improved agricultural technologies to the
world’s farmers. The first is the evolving
environment for protecting intellectual property in
plant innovations. The second is the rapid pace of
discovery and the increasing importance of
molecular biology and genetic engineering. Finally,
the trade in agricultural inputs and outputs is
becoming more open in nearly all countries. These
developments have created a powerful new set of
incentives for investment in private research that
has changed the structure of the public/private
agricultural research endeavor, particularly with
respect to crop improvement (Falcon and Fowler
2002, Pingali and Traxler 2002).
DIRECT DRIVERS
This section reviews some of the most important
direct drivers of ecosystem condition: climate
variability and change, plant nutrient use, land
conversion, invasive species, and diseases.
Climate variability and change
Earth’s climate system has changed since the
preindustrial era, in part because of human
activities, and this change is projected to continue
throughout the 21st century. During the last 100 yr,
the mean global surface temperature has increased
by about 0.6°C (see Fig. 12). Precipitation increased
by 0.5–1% per decade in the 20th century over most

middle and high latitudes of the continents of the
Northern Hemisphere but decreased over much of
the subtropical land areas at a rate of about 0.3%
per decade, although it appeared to recover in the
1990s. Average sea level rose 0.1–0.2 m across the
world. There was a widespread retreat of mountain
glaciers in nonpolar regions, with decreases of about
10% in the extent of snow cover since the late 1960s
and a reduction of about two weeks in the annual
duration of the ice covers of lakes and rivers in the
middle and high latitudes of the Northern
Hemisphere. Also in the Northern Hemisphere, the
extent of the sea ice in the spring and summer has
decreased by about 10–15% since the 1950s.
Carbon dioxide (CO2) is the most important
greenhouse gas, with methane and nitrous oxides as
other contributors. Since 1750, the atmospheric
concentration of CO2 has increased by about 32%
(Houghton et al. 2001). Nearly 80% of the increase
during the past 20 yr is because of fossil fuel
burning, and the rest is attributed to land-use
changes, especially deforestation, and to a lesser
extent to cement production. Atmospheric
concentrations of methane have increased by a
factor of 2.5 since 1750 (from about 700 to 1750
ppb), and they continue to increase (Houghton et al.
2001). The atmospheric concentration of nitrous
oxide has increased by about 17% since 1750 or
from about 270 to 315 ppb (Houghton et al. 2001).
The global mean surface temperature is projected
to increase 1.4–5.8ºC between 1990 and 2100
(Houghton et al. 2001). Precipitation patterns are
projected to change, with most arid and semiarid
areas becoming drier and with an increase in heavy
precipitation events, leading to an increased
incidence in floods and drought.
Nutrient application to agricultural systems
Plant nutrients are essential for food production, but
current methods of fertilizer use contribute to
environmental problems such as greenhouse gas
emissions and eutrophication. Nitrogen and
phosphorus applied on farm fields to help crops
grow can be carried beyond the bounds of the field
to which they are applied, potentially affecting
ecosystems off site.
As discussed in the science and technology section
above, a key component of the technological
advances in agriculture has been the rapid growth
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Fig. 12. Variations in the surface temperature of the Earth from the year 1000 to 2100. SRES stands for
Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (IPCC 2001). Source: IPCC (2002). From "Ecosystems and
Human Well-being: Scenarios, Volume 2" by Steve R. Carpenter, et al., eds. Copyright (c) 2005
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Reproduced by permission of Island Press, Washington, D.C
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in the use of nitrogenous fertilizers. By 1990, the
total amount of reactive nitrogen created by human
activities was about 141 Tg/yr (Table 4). This
represents a ninefold increase over 1890, compared
with a 3.5-fold increase in global population
(Galloway and Cowling 2002).
At a global scale, cereal yields and fertilizer N
consumption have increased in a near-linear fashion
during the past 40 yr and are highly correlated with
one another. Cereals currently account for about
56% of global N fertilizer use (IFA 2002). The ratio
of global cereal production to global fertilizer N
consumption has declined in the past 40 yr, giving
rise to concerns that future increases in N fertilizer
use are unlikely to be as effective in raising yields
as in the past (Tilman et al. 2002). Achieving further
increases in food production will require greater N
uptake by crops and, consequently, either more
external N inputs or more efficient use of N.
Increases in N consumption of 20–60% during the
next 25 yr will be required to keep pace with the
expected demand (Cassman et al. 2003).
A substantial portion of the nitrogen applied is not
used by plants and is carried off the field in runoff.
Such losses of reactive N can damage
environmental services in the receiving ecosystems.
Large differences in nitrogen use efficiency exist
among countries, regions, farms, fields within a
farm, and crop species, because crop yield response
functions to N vary widely among different
environments (Cassman et al. 2002). Improvements
in nitrogen use efficiency require more investment
in technologies that achieve greater congruence
between crop nitrogen demand and nitrogen supply
from all sources and that do not reduce farmer
income.
Phosphorus is widely used in fertilizers and as a
nutrient in supplements for dairy cattle in some parts
of the world. Phosphorus application has increased
threefold since 1960. Unlike nitrogen, which is
transported from the application site in a variety of
ways, phosphorus tends to accumulate in the soil.
Hence, the growth in application is accompanied by
accumulation in soils, which is an indicator of the
eutrophication potential of freshwater lakes and Psensitive estuaries. Global agricultural P budgets
indicate that average P accumulation in agricultural
areas of the world is approximately 8 x 106 Mg/yr
(see Fig. 13), but the rate of annual accumulation
has begun to plateau.

Land conversion
Humans change land use to alter the mix of
ecosystem services provided by that land.
Sometimes the land conversion effort is intentional,
such as plowing grassland to grow crops. In other
cases, land conversion is a consequence of other
activities. For example, salinization is the
unintended consequence of irrigation that does not
have adequate drainage.
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment sponsored
an international effort to document regions around
the world in which rapid and recent changes in land
cover can be shown to have occurred since the 1970s
(Lepers et al. 2005). In this section, we summarize
the results of this study, focusing on four types of
land conversion: deforestation, dryland degradation,
agricultural expansion and abandonment, and urban
expansion.
Deforestation is the single most measured process
of land-cover change at a global scale. During the
industrial era, global forest area was reduced by
40%, with three quarters of this loss occurring
during the last two centuries (Millennium
Ecosystem Assessment 2005a). Forests have
completely disappeared in 25 countries, and another
29 have lost more than 90% of their woodlands.
Although forest cover and biomass in Europe and
North America is currently increasing following
radical declines in the past, the deforestation of
natural forests in the tropics continues at an annual
rate of more than 10 x 106 ha/yr. Deforestation and
forest degradation affect 8.5% of the world’s
remaining forests, nearly half of which are in South
America. Deforestation and forest degradation have
been more extensive in the tropics over the past few
decades than in the rest of the world. Data on boreal
forests are particularly limited, and the extent of
change there is less well known.
Dryland degradation, also called desertification, has
affected parts of Africa, Asia, and Mediterranean
Europe for centuries, parts of America for one or
two centuries, and parts of Australia for 100 yr or
less (Dregne 2002). Approximately 10% of the
drylands and hyperarid zones of the world are
considered degraded, with the majority of these
areas in Asia.
Most of the studies and data sets related to changes
in agricultural land focus on changes in arable land
and permanent crops. The cropland class, defined
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Table 4. Regional creation of reactive nitrogen in the mid-1990s.

World regions

Total
(tg/yr)

Per capita
(kg·person-1·yr-1)

Africa

5.3

7

Asia

68.9

17

Europe and the
former Soviet Union

26.5

44

Latin America

9.4

19

North America

28.4

100

Oceania

2.2

63

140.7

24

World

as areas with at least 10% of croplands within each
pixel, covered 30% of Earth’s surface in 1990. The
exact proportion was between 12 and 14%,
depending on whether Antarctica and Greenland
were included (Ramankutty and Foley 1998).
Around 40% of the cropland class was located in
Asia; Europe accounted for 16%, and Africa, North
America, and South America each accounted for
13%.

consequences of biological invasions (Ehrlich and
Daily 1993, Hughes et al. 1998). In the USA,
invasions of non-native plants, animals, and
microbes are thought to be responsible for 42% of
the decline of the native species now listed as
endangered or threatened (Pimentel 2002). The
threats that biological invasions pose to biodiversity
and to ecosystem-level processes translate directly
into economic consequences such as losses in crops,
fisheries, forestry, and grazing capacity (Mack et al.
2000).

Biological invasions and diseases
Biological invasions are a global phenomenon
affecting ecosystems in most biomes (Mack et al.
2000). Human-driven movement of organisms,
deliberate or accidental, has caused a massive
alteration of species ranges, overwhelming the
changes that occurred after the retreat of the last Ice
Age (Semken 1983). Ecosystem changes brought
about by invasions can have both short-term or
ecological and long-term or evolutionary
consequences. In some ecosystems, invasions by
alien organisms and diseases result in the extinction
of native species or a huge loss in ecosystem
services.
Acceleration of extinction rates as a result of
negative interactions is one of the most important

However, introductions of alien species can also be
beneficial in terms of human population. Some 98%
of the U.S. food supply comes from introduced
species, such as corn, wheat, rice, and other crops,
as well as cattle, poultry, and other livestock
(Pimentel 2002), a statistic likely to be repeated in
most countries.
Invasive and native parasites and pathogens possess
a considerable potential to significantly modify
ecosystem function. This potential stems from both
their diversity and their ability to multiply very
rapidly. Arguably more than half of biodiversity
consists of species that are parasitic on more
conspicuous free-living species (Dobson et al.
1992). In the last 20 yr, studies demonstrating how
pathogens modify and regulate free-living hosts
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Fig. 13. Estimated inputs, outputs, and change in storage of phosphorus on agricultural lands in
developing and developed countries measured in Tetragrams per year. Inputs include fertilizers and
manure; outputs are runoff and crops harvested. Note that the drop in fertilizer use in the industrial
countries in 1996 may be because of greatly reduced use in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
(Bennett et al. 2001). From "Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Scenarios, Volume 2" by Steve R.
Carpenter, et al., eds. Copyright (c) 2005 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment. Reproduced by
permission of Island Press, Washington, D.C.

have completely altered our understanding of the
role that parasites play in natural and humanmodified systems (see, for example, Grenfell and
Dobson 1995).

outcomes. We conclude this paper with a brief
overview of the range of values of drivers in the
scenarios and encourage readers interested in more
details to download the technical volume at the
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Web site (ww
w.MAWeb.org).

CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper focuses on drivers of ecosystem change.
Individual drivers interact with other drivers and
with ecosystems in a complicated dance, of which
we know only a few basic steps. The scenario
results, which are reported in later papers in this
issue, report on our attempts to outline possible

Demographic drivers
The range of population values in the scenarios is
8.1–9.6 x 109 in 2050 and 6.8–10.5 x 109 in 2100
(see Fig. 1). The Order from Strength scenario
generally assumes high fertility and high mortality;
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the Global Orchestration scenario generally
assumes low fertility and low mortality.
Economic drivers
The Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA)
scenarios include a rich set of economic drivers. A
useful summary statistic is the differences across
scenarios in growth rates in total and per capita
income. Per capita income doubles or quadruples
between 2000 and 2050, depending on scenario,
whereas total economic output increases three to six
times.
Sociopolitical, cultural, and religious drivers
Sociopolitical drivers enter the MA scenarios in a
number of ways: human capital and research
investments, extent of international cooperation and
attitudes toward environmental policies, and lifestyle choices affecting energy demand. The Global
Orchestration scenario emphasizes international
cooperation and global flows of capital and
research, whereas Order from Strength sees a
reduction in all forms of international transactions.
Few cultural and religious drivers are built explicitly
into the MA scenario quantitative modeling.
However, changes in culture are an important part
of the qualitative elements of some of the scenarios,
particularly in Adapting Mosaic and to a certain
extent in TechnoGarden. Both scenarios are built
on the assumption that a general shift will occur in
the way ecosystems and their services are valued.
In both cases, decision makers at various scales
develop a proactive approach to ecosystem
management, but they pursue different management
strategies to reach this goal.

Nutrient application in agriculture
All scenarios experience some increase in the use
of nitrogen and phosphorus fertilizers because of
the growing human population and the increased
demand for food. Global Orchestration has the
highest increase in fertilizer use. Increasing
economic openness in this scenario makes fertilizers
available in locations in which they currently are
not commonly used. Much of the increase in
fertilizer use will be in currently poor countries.
Order from Strength also has a large increase in
fertilizer use. In this scenario, however, most of the
increase comes from higher use in wealthier
countries.
Food production in the TechnoGarden scenario
increases, but technical change that reduces the need
for applied nutrients, so the increase in fertilizer use
is the lowest in this scenario. Nutrient use in the
Adapting Mosaic scenario falls in the range of that
of the other scenarios.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol11/iss2/art29/responses/
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Scientific and technological drivers
The MA scenarios include a myriad of different
drivers in the fields of science and technology.
Generally, the Global Orchestration and TechnoGarden
scenarios have the fastest technological change
across a range of industries. Adapting Mosaic has
slower technological advance initially, but more
environmentally friendly improvements occur as
the fruits of the best local solutions spread to other
parts of the world.
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